Date:07/19/94 Page:1

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER: 157-10004-10147

RECORDS SERIES:

CHRONOLOGY

AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA

FROM:

TO:

TITLE:

CHRONOLOGY OF CASTRO ASSASSINATION PLANS

DATE : 00/00/76

PAGES: 24

SUBJECTS:

CASTRO ASSASSINATION PLANS

CUBA

DPERATION MONGOOSE CHRONOLOGY OF PLANS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : U

RESTRICTIONS: 1A, 1B, DONOR REST., REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS : X

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/19/94

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:



110/94 4 poges

EARLY PLANS TO HARASS CASTRO

March-July, 1960

with a chemical to produce temporary disorientation. Plan to cause Castro's beard to fall out by placing thallium salts in his shoes progresses as far as Discussion of plans to sabotage Castro's speeches by contaminating air of radio studio with a substance resembling LSD and by impregnating Castro's cigars testing the chemical on animals.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE OPERATION INITIATED

August, 1960

In August, 1960, DDP BISSELL requested SHEFFIELD EDWARDS, Chief of the Office of Security, to establish contacts with gambling syndicate that was active in Cuba for the purpose of exploring capacity for assassinating Castro. EDWARDS told the case officer for the operation, JAMES O'CONNELL, to contact ROBERT A. MAHEU, a private investigator with syndicate connections. EDWARDS and BISSELL discussed various forms of poisoning with CORNELIUS ROOSEVELT, Chief of TSD.

EDWARD GUNN, Office of Medical Services, receives cigars with orders to contaminate them with lethal material. The cigars are contaminated with Botulinum Toxin by REMIGNOUS TSD.

August 16, 1960 POISON CIGARS

Comments

CASTRO ASSASSINATION PLANS



On January 26, HARVEY discussed the operation with CARROLL SIMPLER. The project was named ZERRIFFIE, darky appearance to make ZERRIFFIE, darky appearance with Compensation of the convertor of procuring code designers. Agent QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by SIMPLE for an operation against Lumumba, was salaried as the principle agent.

On January 26, HARVEY discussed assassination techniques with SYD GOTTLIEB of the TSD.

February 13, 1961 POISONED CIGARS DELIVERED

January-Fébruary, 1961

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: ORTA OPERATION

were supplied to O'CONNELL, who gave them to ROSELLI. ROSELLI reported that the pills had been delivered to JUAN ORTA in Cuba. ORTA kept the pills for a few weeks, and then returned them. GIANCANA suggested the use of poison pills. EDWARDS and O'CONNELL discussed the pills with TREATED of TSD, and by February 10, the pills had been tested for their effectiveness. Shortly thereafter they

Comments

Following ORTA's failure, ROSELLI told O'CONNELL that TRAFFICANTE had approached TONY VERONA, head of a Cuban exile movement fronted by the CIA. VERONA claimed to have a contact inside Cuba who worked at a restaurant frequented by Castro. \$10,000 in cash and \$1,000 in communications equipment were delivered to O'CONNELL to cover operational expenses.

MAHEU; ROSELLI, TRAFFICANTE, and VERONA met at the Fontainbleau Hotel in Miami, and MAHEU delivered the cash and capsules to VERONA. When the operation failed to materialize, VERONA returned the cash.

AMLASH: INITIAL CONTACT

March 9, 1961

Castro.

JAMOK Singmann, of the Nextee City spates of the CIA, met with AMLASH-1, a major in the Cuban army who was disaffected with Castro, in Mexico City on March 9. met with AMLASH-1, a major in the Cuban army who was disaffected with Castro, in Mexico City on March 9. AMLASH-1 requested arms for use in operations against

AMLASH: REQUEST FOR AID IN DEFECTING

March 28, 1961

AMLASH-1 decided to defect and requested aid from ASTERMARTH No assistance was given because of report that Cuban police aware of AMLASH-1's defection plans.



October, 1961

In October, SAM HALPERN of the Caribbean Division attended a meeting with BISSELL and GNOSERY, Branch Chief. BISSELL stated that he had been reprimanded by RFK and JFK for not "gettring rid of" the Castro regime. He ordered HALPERN and COGNEY to plan an operation to get rid of Castro, placing no limitation on the means.

Shortly after the meeting, HALPERN was introduced to GENERAL LANSDALE. HALPERN looked to LANSDALE for guidance and reported to him.

EXECUTIVE ACTION: DECISION TO APPLY PROGRAM TO CASTRO

November 15, 1961

On November 15, HARVEY and BISSELL discussed applying the ZRRIFLE capability against Castro. BISSELL also instructed HARVEY to take over EDWARDS' gambling syndicate operation.

TASK FORCE W: HARVEY TAKES COMMAND

January, 1962

HARVEY was put in charge of Task Force W in January, 1962.

Comments



GAMBLING SYNDICATE: MEETING IN NEW YORK

April 8-9, 1962

HARVEY, O'CONNELL, and ROSELLI met in New York on April 8-9. It is uncertain whether MAHEAU was present.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: WASHINGTON MEETING

April 14, 1962

HARVEY, O'CONNELL, and ROSELLI met in Washington on April 14. ROSELLI was apprehensive about HARVEY and asked O'CONNELL to stay with operation.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: DELIVERY OF PILLS TO ROSELLI

April 19-21, 1962

← MARVEY arrived in Miami with the pills on April
18. HARVEY arrived in Miami with the pills on April

ROSELLI reestablished contact with VERONA, who claimed to have an asset in Cuba who could deposit the pills in Castro's food. ROSELLI told HARVEY that the asset intended to use the pills to assassinate Castro, Che Guevarra, and Raul Castro. HARVEY approved of the targets and gave ROSELLI the pills, who passed them on to his asset (Cuban no. 1). ROSELLI's assistant was an Italian-speaking Cuban named MACEO.

April 21, 1962

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: DELIVERY OF PILLS TO VERONA





October, 1963





FITZGERALD and HELMS agreed that FITZGERALD should meet AMLASH in Paris and hold himself out as a personal representative of RFK. HELMS decided that it was unnecessary to seek approval from RFK because he believed the operation was consistent with RFK's AMLASH-1 insisted on meeting with a senior United States official for assurances of American support. general policies toward Cuba.

FITZGERALD met CUBELA on October 29, and promised to aid any anti-communist groups which could neutralize Castro. CUBELA requested a high-powered rifle with telescopic sights. FITZGERALD told CUBELA that the United States would not take part in an assassination scheme.

AMLASH: DECISION TO PROVIDE RIFLES

November 19, 1963

A memorandum for the record by SANGHEZ dated November 19 states: "C/SAS (FITZGERALD) approved telling CUBELA he would be given a cache inside Cuba. Cache could, if he requested it, include . . . high powered rifles with scopes. . . " with scopes. . .





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December, 1964

SANGELEZEMENT AMLASH-1 in Paris on December 6-7 and indicated that the United States could not provide assistance for his assassination attempt. It was contrived to put AMLASH-1 in contact with ARTIME in the hope that ARTIME would provide AMLASH-1 with a silenced weapon. On December 30, ARTIME met AMLASH in Madrid, and ARTIME agreed to furnish a silencer.

AMLASH: WEAPON DELIVERY

February 11, 1965

On February 114. The Manufact State on cabled: "On 10 or 11 of February CUBELA 18 to receive one pistol with silencer and one Belgian FAL rifle with silencer from ARTINE's secretary. Both weapons come from U.S. and now in Madrid." A cable on February 12 reported that "ARTIME had three packages of special items made up by his technical people and delivered to CUBELA in Madrid."

(B)

AMLASH: TERMINATION

June, 1965

 $\ensuremath{\text{CIA}}$ terminated all contacts with the AMLASH group because it felt that too many people knew about the AMLASH operation.

